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48 ABSTRACT 
In recent years there has  been increasing interest among economists and policy-makers in 
the  contrast  between  the  comprehensive  hiring  and  firing  regulations  in Western  Europe  and 
Japan and their  total  absence  in  the  United States.  The  correlation  between  these  differences 
and  the  low  and  high  rates  of employment  growth of Western  Europe  and  the  United  States 
respectively is  also  often thought  to  be  significant,  even if the  Japanese case  complicates such 
deductions.  The present  paper seeks  in the first  place  to  fill  in for the  serious  lack  of cross-
country  documentation  of  these  employment  regulations.  It  also  sets  out  results  from  new 
surveys  of  how  European  employers  perceive  the  impact  of  these  laws.  Finally,  the  paper 
considers policy options for European countries,  the conclusion  being that a  fairly wide spread 
of moderate but specific policy reforms appears warranted with a view to  helping improve  the 
European employment situation.- However, the option of replicating the  United States model  by 
total deregulation is rejected. -1-
1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is  to  provide a basis for assessing different policy options 
that  exist  in  the  realm  of  employment ·  protection  regulations  and  negotiated  practices.  In 
particular it is  intended to help judge in· what respects the policies of West  European countries 
. may warrant some  reforms with a  view to  helping achieve a higher level of employment under 
socially acceptable conditions. 
Among labour market regulations  that are important for the employment performance of 
the economy,  a  large ·part  fall  under the  colloquial  heading  of "hiring  and  firing  rules". .  The 
main sub-headings here are: 
- hiring rules favouring disadvantaged groups 
- firing rules: 
•  individual dismissal 
•  collective dismissal 
•  layoff and short-time work 
- rules for contracts of limited duration: 
•  temporary work 
•  fixed-term contract 
•  part-time work 
There are· important interdependencies between these items.  Restrictive firing rules  create 
demands for forms  of contract  that circumvent such. rules,  for example  temporary and fixed-· 
term work contracts.  Once a  policy orientation of security of job tenure is  decided upon,  this 
tends  to  lead  to  a  more  extensive  body  of regulations  so  as  to  limit  the  use  of loop-holes. 
Employment protection is in this respect similar to trade protection, where the protection of one 
product leads to the protection of substitutes.  This is  what makes the difference in employment 
protection between the United States on the one hand and Europe and Japan on the other hand 
so  categorical.  The United States has basically an unregulated hiring and firing system, whereas 
Eurppean and Japanese  labour law  is  comprehensive  in these  domains.  In the  absence  of any 
regulation of individual or collective dismissals  the.  United States abstains also from the  fa~rther 
regulation of temporary or fixed-term work-contracts. -2-
In  recent  years  the  subject  of these  hiring  and  firing  practices  has,  in  economic  and 
political  debate,  risen  from  being  one  of  considerable  technical  obscurity  to  one  of  major 
controversy in relation to employment policy. 
The main reason for this seems to lie in the apparent correlation between the differences 
in  the  policy  regimes  in  Europe  and  the  United  States  and  these  economies'  respective 
employment  records.  United  States  employment  growth  has  boomed,  whereas  Europe's 
employment  has  approximately  stagnated.  United  States  hiring  and  firing  practices  are 
completely  unregulated  by  public  law,  whereas  those  of  Europe  are  heavily  regulated. 
Moreover,  Europe's  employment  protection  laws  were  in  many  cases  accentuated in  the  early 
'seventies, about at the time when the European unemployment problem was  beginning to  grow. 
Advocates of deregulation as  a policy philosophy have seized upon this important example with 
enthusiasm.  Analysts  of  the  Euroscelerosis  syndrome  have  often  dwelt  at  length  on  the 
argument  that  overregulation  of  the  labour  market  has  made  the  European  economy 
insufficiently  adaptable  to  changing  economic  conditions.  However,  these  familiar  trans-
Atlantic contrasts are too often much oversimplified.  This is  first of all illustrated by the recent 
emergence of an important trans-Pacific debate which complicates the trans-Atlantic debate.  It 
is  observed that Japan's hiring and firing practices have more in common with those of Europe 
than those of the United States.  Yet  Japan has  avoided an unemployment problem.  It is  also 
argued  by  business  school  analysts  of  the  weak  competitive  position  of  United  States' 
manufacturing industry that the American tradition of free hiring and firing personnel policies 
may be  part of the problem.  By  comparison, the Japanese tradition of employment security is 
associated with heavy investment in personnel training and is  rewarded with qualities of loyalty 
and adaptability on the part of the labour force  (see,  for example Walton  and Lawrence,  1985, 
Ouchi,  1981  and  Thurow,  1985).  Secondly,  the  unregulated  regime- in  the  United  States  is 
showing  increasing  evidence  of  instability  in  the  sense  of  unpredictable  but  often  very 
expensive awards by the courts in the case  of private litigation over the conditions of dismissal 
(Flanagan,  1986 and Manes and Rosenbloom,  1985). 
Meanwhile, economic theory has also contributed to the debate with attempts to bridge the 
gulf separating neo-classical, free market advocates and those who observe employment security 
and economic  efficiency often going  together.  Efficiency  wage  theory  and  implicit  contract (2) 
-3-
theory  are  concerned  with  reasons  why  real  wage  rigidity  and  employment  security  may  in 
certain conditions  be optimal for  both employer  and employee  (see  Akerloff,  1984  and Katz, 
1986).  Following on from this it has also  been argued that where direct or indirect labour costs 
in  the  primary  labour  market  are  too  high  to  permit  a  clearing  of unemployment  from  the 
labour  market,  the  optimal  policy  may  lie  in creating  less  costly  employment  conditions  in a 
secondary  labour  market,  rather  than  trying  to  undermine  the  wage  level  and  employment 
security  in  the  primary  labour  market  (see  Bulow  and  Summers).  In  this  latter  respect  the 
United States  and Japan have  more  in  common,  both having  important elements  of duality  in 
their labour markets.  Europe is more clearly the outsider on this account. 
The debate over desirable employment protection practices is often conducted in extremely 
simplified  and  ideological  terms.  This  is  understandable  in  that  the  subject  matter  is 
complicated  for  any  single  country,  and  formidably  so  for  a  representative  collection  of 
countries.  In addition the subject matter does  not easily yield to quantification, unlike wage or 
social security costs.  This weakness  in political debate is  also  extremely unfortunate, because it 
results  in  an  undue  polarisation  of  positions  and  confrontation.  In  fact  the  subject  matter 
breaks down into large number of eminently negotiable variables.  The choice does  not have  to 
be  between total deregulation on the one  hand and the  impossiblity of dismissals on  the other. 
A very fine graduation of many financial, procedural,  and legal dispositions is  in fact possible, 
and observable in the practices of the industrialised countries.  It is  to  be  hoped that a  better 
informed debate will lead more easily to a consensus on the most suitable policies. 
2. Principles Governing the Economic Impact of Hiring and Firing Regulations 
Regulations which raise  directly or indirectly the costs  of hiring and firing staff may  be 
thought of as  having  the  following  six  kinds of impact on  the behaviour of the enterprise or 
employee. 
(i) Severance and procedural costs or delays  in making dismissals  will cause  higher employment 
than otherwise in periods of weak  demand,  because  the enterprise is  deterred from reducing 
its payroll more quickly (see Gavin, 1986). 
(ii) However  in normal  or good  demand  conditions,  and  in  the  long-run,  severance  costs  and 
delays  will  add an element of fixed  costs  to  the  wage  cost  of labour.  This  fixed  cost  will 
have  some  expected  probability of being  incurred,  depending  on  the  chances  of the  firm's -4-
finding  itself with excess  labour at some  future  time,  thus  reducing  the  demand  for  labour 
and encouraging capital-for-labour substitution (see Gavin, 1986). 
(iii) Severance costs  and procedural constraints will tend to  segment the labour market between 
insiders  with  protected  jobs  versus  outsiders  trying  to  get  jobs.  This  dampens  competitive 
pressures  on  the  wage  level  coming  from  the  unemployed  and  therefore  results  in  less 
employment than otherwise (see Lindbeck and Snower,  1984). 
(iv)  However  analyses  of  labour  markets  of  the  implicit  contract  school  would  point  to 
employment  protection  provisions  reducing  risks  for  the  employee  and  therefore  causing  a 
lower equilibrium wage level, and therefore higher employment (Gavin, 1986). 
(v) The lower probability of dismissal can have an adverse effect on work effort, with reduced 
possibilities for sanctioning  shirking  workers.  This  may also,  by contamination,  weaken  the 
work effort and cooperation of other workers. 
(vi)  However,  increased  job security  is  also  interpreted  in  sociological  literature  as  favouring 
loyalty and dedication of the employee to  the interests of the firm (Akerloff, 1984 ). 
(vii)  Employment  security  will  also,  through  increasing  the  stability  of  the  labour  force, 
encourage the firm to  invest in training and thereby upgrade the  productivity of the worker 
(see Piore, 1986). 
(viii) Employment security may also  increase the willingness of workers  to  accept technological 
change and internal job mobility and so also upgrade productivity (see Piore, 1986). 
Controversy  in  debate  about  employment  protection  regulations  is  immediately 
understandable.  Argument  (i)  is  directly  favourable  to  employment,  argument  (ii)  is 
unfavourable.  Argument (iii)  is  unfavourable  to  employment  indirectly  though  wage  effects, 
whereas argument (iv) is  favourable.  Argument (v) introduces unfavourable productivity effects 
but arguments (vi), (vii), and (viii) are favourable to productivity. 
All of these arguments  are extremely difficult to  estimate quantitatively.  In  some  cases, 
for  example  those  concerning  productivity,  the  importance  of the argument  will  vary  greatly 
between  enterprises  whose  activities  rely  on  team-work,  high  skills  and  changing  technology; 
versus enterprises where jobs are simple  to  learn and  to  supervise.  In  the former  category of 
enterprises  job security provisions  will  be  relatively  more  beneficial or less  costly  than in the 
second category. -5-
One commendable attempt to formalise and quantify the impact of employment protection 
provisions is  in a  paper by  Gavin (1986).  He  has  set up a  model  for testing  the employment 
cost and employment demand effects of severance rules, depending upon the values to be 
placed on a number of key variables, including: 
- the variability of labour demand (  +) 
- the trend growth rate of labour demand (-) 
- the size of severance payments (  +) 
- the rate of natural wastage of labour force (retirement and other voluntary quits). (-) 
The  signs  in  brackets  indicate  the  direction  of impact.  Thus  a  high  trend  growth  of 
labour demand and high rate of natural wastage lower the probable effective costs of severance 
provisions.  High variability of labour demand and high severance payments raise the probable 
cost  of dismissals.  All  these  variables  enter  into  the  equation  because  what  is  important  in 
evaluating severance costs  is  not their simple magnitude (number of months of pay, depending 
upon length of service), but the expected probability that these costs  may be incurred, and the 
expected probability of other procedural delays in the firm's ability to adjust the labour force to 
a level corresponding to product demand. 
The elasticity of labour demand  to  wage  costs  also  enters  into the  equation,  notably  for 
estimating employment impacts.  Gavin's work has  not gone  far in relating the actual situation 
of different  economies  to  the  theoretical  schema,  but this  could  be  done  in  principle.  His 
sensitivity  analysis  suggests  the  possible  employment  effects  to  range  from  the  trivial  to  the 
substantial. 
Two particular points may be underlined at this stage: 
- in periods of low demand, wholesale dismantling of employment protection laws might be 
expected  to  create  more  job losses  than  job creations.  However,  when demand  is  low, 
and expected  to  remain  so  in the  future,  severance  costs  and delays  weigh  particularly 
heavily  on  the  firms'  expected  labour  costs  in  judging  whether  to  hire  new  recruits. 
Therefore,  there  may  be  a  case,  transitionally  at  least,  for  measures  that  retain  the 
aquired  rights  of existing  employees,  but impose  less  heavy  contraints  on new  recruits 
(ways of doing this are discussed further in the concluding chapter). -6-
- in  periods  of  high  demand  and  buoyant  expectations  for  future  growth,  employment 
protection  provisions  may  be  perceived  by  employers  to  be  relatively  costless,  since 
voluntary quits  would  then provide an adequate cushion of flexibility  in the  size of the 
payroll.  But as  the economy moves  into a depressed condition the perceived costs of the 
same  laws  become,  as  already  suggested,  much  higher.  In  this  respect  the  economic 
consequences of employment protection regulations are similar to unemployment benefits. 
When  the  economy  is  functioning  at  high activity rates,  high  l~vels of employment and 
social security seem  entirely  bearable for  the  economy.  However,  these  features  of the 
system  also  make  the  economy  vulnerable  to  a  prolonged  economic  down-turn. 
Employment protection costs  rise  in the same  way as  the social  security bill rises.  Both 
further dampen  the demand  for labour in a  vicious  circle  movement.  Such appears  to 
have  been  the  European experience  in the  period since  1973  (see  also  Blanchard et al, 
1985 and Summers,  1986, and Blanchard and Summers,  1986, on these points.) 
3.  The Broad Picture in Inter-Country Comparisons 
Major differences  in  regimes  for  employment  protection  should  show  up  in  the  rate  of 
turnover of employment. 
One  available  measure  (from OECD,  1985)  is  the  percentage  of employees  holding  their 
jobs for less than two years.  The following rank order has  been noted in recent years: 
Table  1:  Rank order of countries by percentage of employees holding jobs for less than 2 years 
1.  Italy (1978)  13% 
2.  Belgium (1978)  18% 
3.  France (1978)  18% 
4.  Germany (1978)  19% 
Luxembourg (1978)  19% 
Japan (1978)  19% 
European Community average  19% 
7.  Ireland ( 1979)  22% 
8.  United Kingdom (1979)  24% 
9.  Denmark (1978)  27% 
10.  Netherlands (1979)  28% 
11.  United States (1983)  39% 
This measure  immediately suggests  some  convenient rules of thumb.  Short job tenure  is 
on average in Europe about the same as  in Japan, 19% of employees holding jobs for less than 2 -7-
years.  In the United States short tenure is  twice as  frequent,  with 39%  of jobs held for under 
two years. 
Within  Europe,  Germany  and  France  find  themselves  about  at  the  average,  with  Italy 
showing markedly fewer short-term jobs.  The United Kingdom has  more short-term jobs, and 
is  situated together with Denmark and the  Netherlands between the European average and the 
United States. 
A second measure (also  from OECD,  1985) is  the annual turnover rate in the employment 
of enterprises,  as  measured  by  the  average  of  the  number  of  new  recruits  and  separations 
(retirements,  quits  and  dismissals)  per  100  employees.  In  this  case  the  following  rank  order 
emerges  for  the  most  recent  year  available  (data  is  also  given  for  a  decade  earlier,  which 
indicates the trend): 
Table 2:  Percentage annual average of new recruits and separations 
Recent data  Earlier data  Change 
1.  Italy  (1982)  11%  (1971)  28%  -11 
2.  France  (1982)  14%  (1971)  20%  - 6 
3.  Sweden  (1984)  18%  (1974)  26%  - 8 
4.  Japan  (1983)  18%  (1971)  25%  - 7 
European Community average  18%  27%  - 9 
5.  United Kingdom  (1984)  20%  (1971)  30%  -10 
6.  Germany  (1982)  25%  (1973)  33%  - 8 
7.  Finland  (1983)  35%  (1972)  38%  - 3 
8.  United States  (1981)  40%  (1971)  48%  - 8 
Although  these  data  concern  only  manufacturing  industries  (except  for  Germany  and 
Finland where they cover the  whole  economy) a similar story emerges.  Job  turnover averages 
18%  per annum in Europe, as  in Japan,  whereas  it is  about twice  as  high in the United States 
(40%).  Within  Europe,  Italy  is  again  conspicuous  for  the  extremely  low  degree  of  labour 
turnover. 
A  feature  common  to  all  countries,  however,  is  the  reduction  in the  rapidity  of labour 
turnover over the course  of the decade covered in the  data.  For the extent of this  reduction, 
Italy again heads the rank order, followed by the United Kingdom. 
Another indicator of the severity  or otherwise  of policies  towards  dismissals  is  found  in 
surveys  of  unemployed  persons  which  distinguish  between  various  reasons  for  entering 
unemployment (dismissal, resignation, new entrants into the labour force, etc.).  In the following -8-
data, a low percentage of dismissals suggests relatively severe regulations or practices restraining 
dismissals, whereas a high percentage suggests a liberal dis.missals regime. 
Table 3:  Percentage of unemployed, 1981, who became so  because of dismissal or redundancy 
Italy  8% 
Greece  37% 
France  41% 
European Community average  43% 
United States  52% 
United Kingdom  56% 
Netherlands  58% 
Denmark  83% 
Source: for European countries Eurostat, 1983. 
For United States:  Bureau of Labor Statistics  Monthly Labor Review.  The U.S.  figure  includes 
16% on lay-off. 
The  United States  ranks  higher than the  European Community  on  average  in  the  extent 
the unemployed became so  because of dismissal, but by a smaller margin than the preceding two 
indicators  of labour  market  flexibility.  (It  is  possible  that  the  data  in  Table  3  are  not  too 
comparable,  the  United  States  unemployed  showing  a  particularity  high  percentage  of  re-
entrants  into  the  labour  market  which  may  be  due  to  the  short  duration  of unemployment 
benefits.  However, cyclical fluctuations  in the  percentage of dismissals among  the unemployed 
are not very high, ranging in the 'eighties between 50 and 59%  in the United States.) 
As  between  European  countries,  these  figures  confirm  other  indicators  of the  extreme 
difficulty  of making  dismissals  in  Italy;  as  also  the  finding  of Germany  and  France  in  the 
middle of the European range,  with the  United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark at the 
liberal end. 
The  high  dismissals  figure  for  Denmark  deserves  special  note,  not  only  because  of its 
extreme  level.  Denmark did  not  participate  in the  E.C.'s  survey  of employers,  and  so  is  not 
included in a number of tabulations below.  However,  the above finding from Eurostat's labour 
force  sample  survey is  consistent with the view  that Denmark's legislation  on  dismissals  is  the 
most  liberal  in  the  E.C.  It  is  also  the  case  in  the  period  1983  to  1985  that  Denmark's 
employment level  has grown faster  than in any other E.C.  country, suggesting a  high  elasticity 
of employment to changing economic conditions when the regulation of dismissals is  liberal. 
As  regards  Italy's  very  low  dismissals  figure,  the  counterpart is  found  in  the  very  high 
percentage  (78%)  of Italy's  unemployed  who  are  first  job  seekers,  compared  to  22%  for  the -9-
European Community on average  and  13%  for the United States.  The high percentage of first 
job  seekers  reflects  a  very  acute  youth  unemployment  problem.  This  illustrates  how 
employment protection law  may  affect the  trade-off of interests  between  different sections  of 
the Community. 
In order to  obtain more  detailed  information on  the  perceptions of employers as  regards 
the  employment  impact  of  these  and  other  regulations,  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities  undertook  in  1985  a  detailed  harmonised  survey  of 50,000  companies  in  9  EC 
countries (C.E.C.,  1986).  The results  indicated the following  rank order of countries according 
to the importance enterprises  attached to  "insufficient flexibility  in hiring and shedding labour 
as reason for not employing more stafr': 
Table 4:  Percentage of firms  considering insufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding rules  to 
be an important obstacle to employing more staff 
1.  Italy  83% 
2.  France  81% 
3.  Belgium  75% 
4.  Greece  67% 
5.  Ireland  68% 
European Community average  60% 
6.  Luxembourg  56% 
7.  Germany  56% 
8.  Netherlands  51% 
9.  United Kingdom  26% 
These  findings  are  again  broadly  consistent  with  those  already  reported  from  labour 
turnover  data.  Germany  is  close  to  the  European  average.  Italy  is  the  country  where  the 
regulatory  burden  is  most  widely  considered  to  be  an  important  impediment  to  employment. 
The  United Kingdom  is  at the  other extreme  where  only a  minority of firms  consider hiring 
and firing  regulations  to  represent an important obstacle  to employment.  France, Belgium and 
Greece are also  reported by their industrialists to have problematic regulations from the point of 
view of increasing employment.  French regulations were subsequently eased in 1986. 
Further use  will  be  made  of this  survey  below  on  more  detailed  aspects  of hiring  and 
firing  regulations,  as  also  of another  survey  by  the  International  Organisation  of Employers 
(IOE,  1985). 
Opinion  surveys  of this  kind  are  sometimes  considered  to  be  of questionable  scientific 
value, especially where they touch on policy issues, as  in these cases.  The replies may be biased -lO-
by the political interests of respondents, so  the criticism may go.  Some  reassurance against this 
concern,  however,  is  suggested  by  the  fairly  good  correspondence  between  the  statistics  on 
labour turnover quoted above, and the summary results from the Commission's survey. 
4.  Rules of Recruitment 
It is  normally the case  that employers are free to  decide whom they hire.  The regulation 
of recruitment  largely  concerns  under  what  conditions,  or  how  they  are  recruited.  However 
there are some exceptions to the normal freedom over whom to recruit. 
The  employment  of  black  and  Hispanic  people  and  women  has  been  favoured  by 
affirmative  action  legislation  in  the  United  States  since  1965,  when  federal  contractors  were 
required by an Executive Order to make "good  faith efforts" to  employ minorities.  Enterprises 
were required to compare their employment record for these groups with the  regional average. 
Companies  with  poorer  records  risked  the  sanction  of  being  debarred  from  government 
contracts.  Only  30  such cases  are known to  have  been  treated this  way,  but many more  may 
have been influenced by the threat.  50,000 companies, employing 23  million workers have been 
affected.  Leonard (1985) has conducted research on the difference in employment performance 
between this group of enterprises and the rest of the economy.  His findings were that over the 
period 1974 to 1980 the growth rate of employment for this group of companies was  3.8% faster 
for black men, 7.9%  faster. for black women, 2.8%  faster for white women and 12.3%  faster for 
women.  For  white  men,  the  growth  was  1.2%  slower.  However,  in  1986  the  Reagan 
administration decided to  amend this  legislation,  making  the target  indicators  voluntary rather 
than obligatory.  (New York Times, January 11,  1986). 
In  Europe  and  Japan  there  is  no  comparable  legislation,  although  the  relatively 
unfavourable employment situation of ethnic minorities in several European countries is creating 
an  increasingly  similar  situation  to  that  of  racial  minorities  in  the  United  States.  Anti-
discrimination legislation exists in European countries, including the Unted Kingdom. 
Only  one  European  country,  Italy,  has  attempted  to  regulate  precisely  whom  is  to  be 
recruited.  The  public  employment service  there  implements  a  law  which  requires  companies 
seeking to  hire workers to  follow a rank ordering of candidates determined administratively by 
the public employment service.  This  so-called "numerical"  system  in principle lists  candidates 
by  order  of  merit  according  to  some  social  criteria,  like  the  size  of  the  person's  family (3) 
-II-
commitments  and  the  length  of  unemployment  spell.  The  system  is  widely  criticised  by 
employers,  and  it!:  considerable  impracticability  has  led  to  its  limitation  in various  ways  (jobs 
requiring special skills are excluded, as  are firms  with less  than S employees, the recuritment of 
up to 10% of workers in large firms, the recruitment of relatives, etc).  In 1985, the government 
decided to  allow  firms  to  recruit young  people  for apprenticeships  and  otherwise  SO%  of their 
needs  freely,  leaving  only  the  remainder  determined  by  the  numerical  rank  order.  These 
exceptions  relax  the  law,  while  adding,  however,  to  the  complexity  of the  regulations  and 
administrative practice.  The external observer of the Italian labour market may  be  inclined to 
regard  these  rem~uning constraints  in  the  system  as  archaic,  bureaucratic  anomalies,  due  for 
scrapping.  Since  this  regulation  was  introduced,  there have  been major developments in many 
other features of 1:he  Italian social security system.  The case  there may have been at some stage 
for  using  recruit11ttent  regulations  of this  type  an  instrument  of social  policy  has  surely  been 
greatly weakened. 
An issue  of concern to more European countries is  the performance of public employment 
offices,  and  their  monopoly  status  in  most  countries.·  The  business  community  is  often  very 
critical of the  qu~~lity of help effectively given by public employment agencies.  For example, a 
recent government survey in Denmark  reported  that only  10%  of vacancies  were  filled  by the 
public  employme11t  service,  and  that  many  employers  and  job seekers  had  virtually  given  up 
using it.  Why  ellttployment  agencies  should  be a monopoly  of the public sector is  not evident. 
In any case the public agencies only enjoy a monopoly in a narrow sense,  since a large amount 
of recruitment is  done  by other means, for example,  direct advertising  in the  press.  In  Italy 
regulations  are  aJ~ain more  stringent  than  elsewhere.  An  employment  contract  made  directly 
with an individual is subject to  annulment by the law if it is  not ratified by being put, ex-post, 
through  the  mediation  of  the  public  agency.  Italy,  alone  with  Sweden,  prohibits  private 
temporary work :!lgencies  (see  further  below).  The  demand  for  temporary  labour  in  Italy has 
therefore  to  be  <:hannelled  through  the  public  agencies,  where  the  procedures  mesh  with  the 
"numerical"  syste1m,  described  above,  of  rank  -ordered  candidates.  These  provisions  have 
encouraged  the  expansion  of sub-contracting  work  to  small  enterprises,  including  some  1  1/2 
million  home-workers  who  can  classify  themselves  as  self  -employed  and· escape  the  various 
official regulations. -12___.:_ 
Alone  among  European  countries,  the  United  Kingdom  permits  licensed  private 
employment agencies to function alongside the public employment services. 
In  the  United  States  there  is  no  regulation  of  private  employment  agencies,  or  other 
methods  of  recruitment.  A  recent  sample  survey  of  manufacturing  enterprises  showed  the 
following  numbers  of  companies  to  be  using  the  various  means  or  channels  of  recruitment 
indicated: 
trade union  16 
public employment agencies  77 
private employment agencies  78 
advertising in media  85 
recommendation  84 
schools, colleges  171 
Employment  of  handicapped  persons.  This  is  the  sole  category  of  persons  which  is 
generally  supported  in  Europe  by  affirmative  regulations  (see  Commission  of the  European 
Communities,  1985).  Germany's  employment  policies  towards  handicapped  persons  may  be 
described  as  a  model  case.  Enterprises  with  over  15  employees  are  required  to  take  on 
handicapped persons to the extent of a 6%  quota.  Companies not fulfilling the quota pay a fine 
of  DM  100  per  month  per  head  (about  20%  of  the  average  wage  in  manufacturing),  and 
companies  more  than  fulfilling  the  quota  benefit from  a  subsidy  from  a  fund  into  which the 
fines are paid. 
The  other  large  European  countries  also  set  quotas  (France  10%,  United  Kingdom  3%, 
Italy  15%).  France also  has  a fine and subsidy system  as  in Germany.  The United Kingdom 
does  not  apply  financial  sanctions,  but  modulates  hiring  and  firing  rules  for  companies  not 
fulfilling the quota.  Italy's quota regime is  a simple regulatory requirement. 
The smaller European countries have a mix of regimes, some applying quotas· some making 
no quantified requirement. 
The Italian policy rules appear to  be the most demanding and rigid.  The Italian quota of 
15%  is exceptionally high  - a surprisingly high  19%  of the population are registered as ·disabled 
or handicapped.  Less  surprisingly,  Italy  only achieves  an  actual  disabled  employment  rate of 
4.5%,  which is  about the same  as  for Germany (4.8%  - 1980  figures).  The Italian regulation, 
according  to  anecdotal information, acts  a stimulus to  keeping  small  enterprises just below  the 
maximum  size  that  escapes  the  regulation.  A  more  flexible  regime  is  to  apply  fines  and -13-
subsidies  around  the  quota  as  in  the  German  case.  In  this  way  the  unevenness  in  local  or 
sectional labour supply and demand conditions for handicapped person can be smoothed out. 
The United States  has  an Executive Order recommending  affirmative action  in favour  of 
handicapped  persons,  but there  is  no  compulsion  or enforcement,  and so  the  measure  may  be 
effectively disregarded. 
Table 5:  Employment regulations for handicapped person 
United States 
France 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Norway 
Ireland 
Greece 
no obligations 
10% quota for firms with over 10  employees; fines for underfulfillment, 
subsidies ·for recruitment 
6%  quota for firms with over 15 employees; fines of DM  150  per month 
for underfu1fillment, subsidies for overfulfillment 
3%  quota for  firms  with over 20  employees;  limitations on  freedom  to 
hire  able-bodied  persons  for  underfulfillment  and  restrictions  on 
dismissal of handicapped persons 
15% quota for firms with over 35  employees 
no  mandatory quotas 
3-7% quota may  be prescribed by the Social  Insurance Council if firms 
efforts are judged insufficient 
no mandatory quotas 
no mandatory quotas 
no  mandatory quotas 
3% quota, mandatory only in public sector 
7%  quota for handicapped  persons and war veterans for firms with  100 
employees or more 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1983), other national sources. 
5.  Systems for Individual Dismissals 
In  Europe  the  rules  of  individual  dismissal  often  distinguish  between  cases  involving 
criminal acts  and  gross  misconduct on  the  one  hand,  and cases  based  on  economic  conditions 
such  as  redundancy  and  the  professional  suitability  or  qualifications  of the  employee.  The 
former category generally allows  summary dismissal  without compensation.  The latter category - 14-
generally  involves  statutory  procedures,  periods  of notice,  and minimum  amounts  of financial 
compensation.  (See  I.R.E., 1984, and E.I.R.R., 1985,  1986.) 
The procedures for the dismissals  based on economic and professional reasons are often set 
out in extensive detail. 
Procedures  differ in many  details  among  European countries.  One  key  issue  is  how  far 
the employer's prerogative to decide on his employment decisions is  reduced by the role of third 
parties - trade unions, works councils, government or the courts.  It is frequent for one or other 
of these  third  parties  to  possess  considerable  discretionary  powers.  In  the  Netherlands  the 
government's  labour  service  must  approve  the  decision.  In  Germany,  Italy  and.  Sweden  the 
works council or trade unions must be  consulted.  In France this  was  the case  until  1986  when 
the  new  government  repealed  this  requirement.  In  Germany  if the  works  council  does  not 
agree,  the  dismissed  employee  may  take  the  case  to  the  labour  court,  where  procedures  are 
sometimes  very  long  and drawn  out (up  to  5 years)  during  which  time  the  employee  must ·be 
retained  on  full  pay.  This  is  the  normal  procedure.  However  there  are  cases  in  which  the 
works council's agreement. must be  obtained, failing which the employer must go  the the labour 
court.  In Italy appeal to the courts is  likely to see the judiciary take such a favourable view of 
the  employee's  social  or family  problems  that  dismissal  is  commonly  judged to  be  practically 
impossible.  In  Sweden  the  trade  union  has  a  legal  role  in determining  in  the  first  instance 
whether  a  dismissal  is  unreasonable:  the  employer  can  appeal  to  the  courts  against  an 
unfavourable  position  but will  rarely  win.  Other European  countries  with  onerous  dismissals 
procedures are Portugal, Spain, Norway, Belgium and Ireland. 
The  Japanese  system  for "regular"  employees  is  equivalent  to  these  European  systems  in 
restraining dismissals.  Case-law establishes that dismissal for disciplinary reasons  should not be 
overly severe.  For example, in a key case, a news  broadcaster for the early morning news twice 
overslept.  He  was  dismissed but through an appeal  to  the courts he  was  reinstated (see  Shioda 
V.  Kochi Broadcasting  Co.,  1977  in Sugeno,  1986).  Dismissal  for economic  reasons  has  to  be 
very strongly justified (see also  under collective redundancies). 
The  United  States,  by  contrast,  has  no  general  legislation  governing  of  dismissals. 
Traditionally,  since  the  19th  century,  employers  have  been  free  to  terminate  contracts  of 
employment "at  will"  for any  reason,  subject only to  limitations  established  in the  individual's -15-
contract of employment  or a  collective  bargaining  agreement.  Such  contracts  and agreements 
may  fix  periods  of notice  and  amounts  of compensation,  but  this  is  not  required  by  law. 
Recently, however, the courts in many states have been moving away somewhat from the ultra-
free  firing  model,  requiring  that dismissals  be  justified on  reasonable  grounds.  A  few  states 
still  adhere  to  the  19th  century  presumption,  one  state  court even  affirming  in  1956  that  an 
employer  can  freely  fire  an  employee  "for  good  cause,  or  bad  cause,  or  no  cause  at  all". 
However,  the trend is  against this view.  Twenty-nine states recognise exceptions to  the at-will 
doctrine.  The number of wrongful  termination law  suits  has  increased  dramatically  in recent 
years - with 10  fold increases each year.  Legal experts consider that this trend will continue as 
lawyers find such cases easy to prosecute and promise potentially staggering awards.  Manes and 
Rosenbloom of Harvard Law School conclude their detailed study (1985) in the following terms: 
· "Corporations  and  businesses  facing  such  large  damage  claims  are  looking  for 
wages  of limiting  their  risks  in  the  ."Russian  roulette" · of employee  law  suits. 
Legislatures  are  considering  proposals  that  wouid  change  the  entire  termination 
at-will presumption.  The courts are struggling towards a more precise definition 
of what constitutes a wrongful termination...  this area of law is an muddled and 
confusing as  it is  significant... The conclusion seems  unavoidable  that legislation 
is required to balance the interests of all concerned". 
Flanagan  ( 1986)  reports  an  analysis  of  I 02  cases  in  Californian  courts  of  wrongful 
discharge  between  1982  and  1986.  Three-quarters  of the  plaintiffs'  cases  were  upheld  with 
awards  for  general  damages  averaging  $344,000,  and  awards  for  punitive  damages  $557,000. 
Thus the costs of "freedom" to dismiss staff in the United States can be  very high compared to 
statutory provisions in Europe.  In fact the United States paradigm of free hiring and firing and 
non-regulation appears in practice to have become unstable, and ultimately unsustainable.  While 
federal  legislation  appears  highly  unlikely for  the  time  being,  it  is  not  inconceivable  that 
individual states  may  provide  a  clearer  and  more  settled  framework  for  the  private  sector  to 
follow. 
The  United  Kingdom's  regime  is  worth  noting  as  one  which  is  regulated  in  order  to 
protect against unfair dismissal but nonetheless gives  the employer a considerable prerogative to 
dismiss  redundant or poorly  adapted staff,  with  moderate  amounts  of financial  compensation. -16-
However,  neither  government  or  trade  union  approval  is  required,  and  the  arbitration  and 
tribunal  system  for  dealing  with  complaints  over  unfair  dismissal  is  expeditious  and  fairly 
sympathetic to the employer's management concerns.  Only one-third of complaints reaching the 
tribunal stage are upheld, and most cases are disposed of within three months of submission to 
the  courts  (see  Annex  3 for  detail).  In  1985  the  rules  were  relaxed  by raising  the  minimum 
period of service required before the tribunal system for unfair dismissal could be used from  I 
to 2 years.  Ireland has  a tribunal system that appears to be comparable with the British system 
(in  1983  about  one-third  of cases  heard  in  Ireland  were  found  in  favour  of  the  employee 
charging unfair dismissal). 
6.  Rules for Collective Redundancies 
As  in  the  case  of individual  dismissals,  the  conditions  for  collective  redundancies  are 
regulated  in Europe  by law.  An EC  Directive  of 1975  stipulates  some  minimum  conditions, 
such as  30  days  of prenotification to  be  given to  workers  representatives.  EC  countries  have 
since  adapted their laws  as  necessary.  Similar  laws  have  generally  been  introduced governing 
plant closures. (See  I.R.E., 1984, and E.I.R.R., 1985,  1986.) 
In  the  United  States,  by  contrast,  there  is  no  general  law,  any  legal  requirements 
depending  upon  the  terms  of collective  bargains  (see  Harrison,  1984).  In  1980  only  15%  of 
collective  bargains  contained  prenotification  procedures.  In  1981  a  Supreme  Court  decision 
ruled that a company may close a plant without notification or bargaining with the trade union, 
unless  the  collective  bargaining  contract  contains  a  "preservation  of work"  clause.  In  recent 
years  there  has  been some  publicity given  to  agreements  in  the automobile  and meat-packing 
sectors  in  which  job-security  provisions  were  granted  in  exchange  for  concessions  on  work 
practices or pay.  However, a survey of such contracts agreed in  1982  suggests  that the typical 
deal saw  withdrawal of a planned closure or lay-off against concessions over wage  levels  rather 
than commitments  to  a different system  governing  job  tenure.  Moreover,  a study  by Capelli 
and  McKersie  shows  that  most  of these  enterprises  in  fact  soon  closed  down  the  plants  in 
question. 
In  Europe  the  restraints  imposed  upon  management  are  often  analogous  to  those  for 
individual dismissals.  Prenotification  delays  are  added  to  the  specific  notice  periods  owed  to 
individuals as  a  function of years of service.  Trade union consultation is  frequently  required, -17-
and government authorisation needed  in some  cases  (Netherlands, Greece, Spain,  Portugal and, 
until 1986, France).  The effective importance of the intervention of the government is  hard to 
assess.  On the one hand the enterprise may see  the government's powers of approval or refusal 
as  limiting an important management prerogative.  However, the enterprise unable to  adjust its 
labour force  to  economic  necessities  will  go  bankrupt,  and  the  labour  ministry  will  hardly be 
interested in provoking  this.  The  government's  authorisation  may, .  in  some  cases,  amount  to 
little  more  than  registering  an  event,  and  putting  pressure  on  the  enterprise  to  show  that  it 
considered alternative solutions.  In Spain the intervention of the labour ministry amounts more 
to  deliberating  on  whether dismissals  are  to  be  classified  as  fair  or unfair  than  to  preventing 
dismissals;  however,  compensation  for. unfair dismissal  is  extremely  high  (see  below).  In  the 
Netherlands, the government in  1985  decided to  limit to  four-to-six weeks  the maximum time 
.its  agencies  could  take  to  deliberate  on  proposed  dismissals.  In  France,  too,  the  government 
promised in 1985  to shorten ·delays in which  the Administration decides on proposed dismissals 
(it agreed to 90%  of requests in recent years).  In  1986  the new government scrapped the need 
for administrative approval. 
In  Europe,  the  cost  of compensation  to  redundant  personnel  is  usually  expressed  as  a 
function  of years  of service,  but  is  often a  complicated  formula.  The  range  for  blue  collar 
workers  is  between  1/2 week's  pay  per year  of service  (France),  about  I  week  (Netherlands, 
United Kingdom), rising to as  much as  4 weeks in Spain.  For Germany, Denmark, Norway and 
Finland the law  leaves  the  amount open  to  negotiation.  Compensation  for  unfair dismissal  is 
often much higher, 5 months minimum in Italy, 6 months minimum in Belgium,  16-32 months 
in Sweden and up to 42  months in Spain.  The Belgian government in 1985 significantly reduced 
the scale for compensation awards. 
In the United Kingdom the relatively modest cost of redundancies are also  35%  subsidised 
by public funds for enterprises with less  than 10  employees.  This makes  the British regulations 
the  lightest  in  Europe  except  perhaps  for  Denmark  and  Finland  which  leave  redundancy 
compensation to be fixed by contract or collective bargain. 
In  Japan  the  lifetime  employment tradition  in large  enterprises  is  buttressed strongly  by 
the requirements of case  law decided by the lower courts, although general legislation makes  no 
requirement other  than  30  days  notice  (see  Inagami,  1984).  Case  laws  makes  it clear  that an -18-
extensive set  of preconditions  have  to  be  met  before  redundancies can be  admitted (see  Toyo 
Sanso  K.K.  v.  Koji  Shimazaki  et  al,  in  Sugeno,  1986).  The  objective  need  to  make 
redundancies for economic reasons  has  be established, and a  specific list of alternative courses 
of action has to be exhausted such as  recourse to internal transfer of surplus staff, work-sharing 
and  part-time  practices,  national  wastage  through  non-replacement  of  retiring  personnel, 
dismissal of temporary workers and calls for voluntary early retirement.  Trade unions have also 
to be consulted.  In practice the possibilities for internal deployment of manpower in large firms 
and  the  other  techniques  are  such  as  to  make  redundancies  a  rare  event.  However,  smaller 
firms  make  more  recourse  to  these  legal  possiblities  for  dismissal.  The  lump-sum  payments 
made to dismissed staff are very large, but these can be confused with the system of retirement 
gratuities.  On  average  on  retirement  a  Japanese  worker  receives  about  43  months  pay  as  a 
gratuity,  but 55%  of firms  have  no  private  pension  scheme.  A  dismissed employee  receives  a 
similarly important sum, but this implicitly contains quasi-retirement benefits. 
The  International  Organisation  of Employers  in  1985  (I.O.E.,  1985)  reported  how  each 
country's employers organisation assessed the severity of the rules restraining the termination of 
employment contracts. 
Table 6:  Importance of obstacles to the termination of employment contracts 
1.  Obstacles are fundamental 
2.  Obstacles are serious 
3.  Obstacles are minor 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Austria 
Belgium 
Ireland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Finland 
4.  Obstacles are insignificant 
United Kingdom (4) 
- 19-
According  to  the  Commission's  survey  in  1985  (C.E.C.,  1986)  European  Community  countries 
assessed  the  possible  employment  impact  of shorter  periods  of  notice  for  redundancies  and 
simpler legal procedures in the following rank order: 
Table  7:  Percentage of firms  judging that there would  be  a  positive employment impact from 
shorter periods of notice for redundancies and simpler legal procedures 
1.  Italy  88% 
2.  Greece  76% 
3.  Belgium  74% 
4.  Germany  63% 
European Community average  58% 
5.  Luxemburg  54% 
6.  France  48% 
7.  Netherlands  47% 
8.  Ireland  35% 
9.  United Kingdom  28% 
As  regards  the  question  whether  a  reduction  in  redundancy  payments  would  have  a 
positive employment impact, the Commission survey (C.E.C.,  1986) showed the following  rank-
order: 
Table 8:  Percentage of firms considering that a reduction in redundancy payments would have a 
positive employment impact 
1.  Italy  78% 
2.  Belgium  63% 
3.  Greece  62% 
4.  Luxemburg  52% 
5.  Germany  46% 
European Community average  42% 
6.  Ireland  33% 
7.  United Kingdom  23% 
8.  France  22% 
9.  Netherlands  12% -20-
It is  notable  that the financial  cost of redundancy payments  was  in all  countries considered to 
be  a  less  important  problem  than  the  length  of  notice  periods  and  the  difficulty  of  legal 
procedures.  This  is  particularly  so  in  the  case  of France  (indeed,  as  noted  earlier,  French 
compensation payments are among the lowest, but procedures have been onerous). 
This  general  classification  accords  well  with  the  main  regime  features  described  above. 
The countries  in the  first category of the  I.O.E.  survey (France,  Germany,  Italy,  Netherlands, 
Portugal,  Spain)  all  featured  in  1985  the  intervention  of  trade  unions,  works  councils  or 
government in the  procedures and authorisation of dismissals  (collective  or individual or both). 
At the  other end of the  scale  are  countries  which  have  no  governmental  interference  in  the 
decision process and where the amounts of compensation are  not determined by law  (Denmark, 
Finland) or are low (United Kingdom). 
7.  Lay-Offs or Short-Time Working 
A  lay-off  is  an  arrangement  whereby  a  worker  is  required  to  stop  working  for  a 
temporary period,  but without termination of the employment contract.  The  worker is  usual!y 
not  paid wages  by the  employer,  but receives  compensation  from  public funds.  Alternatively 
employees may  be required to  work on a  short-time basis,  for example,  two  to  three days  per 
week.  As  techniques adjusting labour costs in the light of cyclical demand movements, lay-offs 
and short-time are in principle more flexible than recruitment and dismissal on and off. 
Regimes facilitating  total lay-off of personnel are not widespread.  The possibility to  lay-
off workers completely exists only in the United States and Italy among  the larger industrialised 
countries where the practice is  widely used.  Some  smaller European countries also  have lay-off 
arrangements  (Belgium,  Norway)  but  short-time  working  is  the  more  general  alternative  in 
Europe (EIRR, 1983).  The number of workers laid-off in the United States tended to  fluctuate 
between  1 to  2  million  in the  period  1960  to  1981,  from  cyclical  peak  to  trough (BLS,  1983). 
Laid-off workers benefit from the same compensation as  in the case of unemployment. -21-
The  only  European  country  to  have  a  somewhat  comparable  regime  is  Italy  where  the  CIG 
(Cassa  Integrazione  Guadanzi  - "complementary  integration  fund")  provides  compensation  of 
80%  of  prior  earnings.  The  original  intention  of  the  CIG  was  that  it  allow  for  cyclical 
flexibility  in the labour costs  of industrial employers  - thus  close  to  the  United States system. 
However it gradually became a shadow unemployment compensation scheme that offered often 
indefinite  benefits  of  much  higher  amount  than  the  official  unemployment  scheme.  For 
example,  in  March  1986  it  was  announced  that  FIAT  was  going  to  reemploy  about  6,000 
workers  who  had  been  laid-off  for  nearly  six  years.  The  CIG  has  in  effect  given  cost 
flexibility  to  employers,  but has  at  the  same  time  frozen  a  sizeable  fraction  of the  industrial 
labour  force  in  inactive  situations,  except  that  reports  of  beneficiaries  working  the  black 
economy  are  legion.  Since  the  CIG  was  much  expanded  in  the  1970s  labour  turnover  in 
industry has dropped by one half (see D'  A  pice and Del Boza,  1985). 
The  more  common  type  of  regime  in  Europe  is  short-time  working  or  "partial 
unemployment."  This  is  the  case  in  France,  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  Spain  and  the 
Benelux countries.  Typically the worker is  compensated as  a  percentage of lost earnings at the 
level of unemployment benefits or somewhat less. 
Perceptions of competitive  disadvantage  suffered by  European companies  compared  with 
the  United States  are  illustrated  by  the  example  of competition  between  between  Boeing  and 
Airbus in the aircraft industry.  Boeing has in the last decade resorted to  some massive lay-offs 
and recalls  in order to respond  rapidly to changing  demand conditions.  Airbus,  manufacturing 
in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain,  has  much  greater difficulty in adjusting 
to  peaks in demand.  It has  to take a longer-term view of demand  prospects in recruiting,  and 
typically is  more cautious in taking on extra staff.  As  a result delivery delays are often twice as 
long for Airbus, compared to Boeing.  (See  The Sunday Times, 2 March 1986, "Airbus Flies into 
Battle.") -22-
Table 9:  Lay-off or short-time working regimes 
United States 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Norway 
Switzerland 
Greece 
Spain 
Source: EIRR, 1983. 
Lay-off regime, compensation as  for unemployment. 
Compensation  for  reduced  working  time  up  to  total  of  50o/o  of gross 
hourly earnings, up to 600 hours of reduced time per year. 
Compensation  for reduced working time  up to  68o/o  of net earnings for 
up  to  24  months;  1/3  of  employees  must  be  idle  for  over  1  Oo/o  of 
working time. 
Compensation  of  up  to  80%  of  gross  earnings  paid  by  the  Cassa 
Integrazione Guadanzi for up to 40  hours per week, ordinarily for up to 
a  year,  but  in  practice  indefinitely  in  the  case  of  recognized 
reorganisations.  In  1987  government proposes to  limit indemnities to  3 
years. 
No  provisions  under  public  law  or  social  security;  only  as  may  be 
negotiated in collective bargains. 
Compensation  in line  with  unemployment benefits  is  paid  for up  to  4 
weeks  of lay-off or 3 months of part-time work, on condition that full 
time working then resumes. 
Compensation  in line  with unemployment benefits  is  paid  for  up  to  6 
weeks for reduced working time. 
Compensation  in  line  with  normal  pay  for  up  to  30  days  a  year,  the 
employer being reimbursed at most for 23  days. 
Compensation  in  line  with unemployment  benefits is  paid for up to  40 
weeks in respect of complete workless days. 
Compensation in line with unemployment benefits. 
Compensation of 50% of normal pay for up to 3 months per year. 
Compensation  in line with unemployment benefits is  paid for up to  18 
months in respect of reduced working time. 
8.  Temporary Work and Fixed-Term Employment Contracts 
Temporary work tends to be of two types: 
(i) the supply by specialised temporary work agencies of personnel to another company for 
short periods, in which the workers are legally employed by the agency; 
(ii) direct employment on contract for a  short and  fixed  time duration,  such  as  seasonal 
jobs in agriculture and tourism. (S) 
-23-
Trade  unions  are  usually  strongly  opposed  to  such  practices  and  often  argue  that  they 
should outlawed.  They see dangers of competition in the labour market from groups  that will 
have  weak  market  power,  of  abuse  by  employers  of  their  market  power  in  relation  to 
unorganised labour, and a way of circumventing employment protection laws.  Employers point 
to  the need to  assure the supply of labour for seasonal or other irregular demands.  Individual 
countries seem  in their policies  towards  temporary work  to  typify their broader tendencies on 
questions of labour market rigidity or flexibility (see Albeda (1985) for a detailed account). 
Thus  in  the  United  States  there  is  no  regulation  or  licensing  requirement  at  all  of 
temporary  work  companies  or individual  employment.  The  numbers  of persons  employed  in 
this  way  increased  very  fast  in  the  years  since  1982  (see  Carey  and  Hazelbaker,  1986). 
According  to  Albeda  (1985)  some  500  private  companies  compete  in  supplying  temporary 
workers,  amounting  1  1/2 to  3  million  people  depending  upon  estimates  (2-4%  of the  work 
force).  Such  personnel  is  covered  by  general  labour  law  (including  the  minimum  wage)  and 
social security.  However, the conditions of employment usually exclude fringe benefits such as 
holidays, holiday pay, and private pension and health insurance benefits; the latter are of course 
particularity  important  in  the  United  States  since  public  health  insurance  is  not  generally 
available.  The  workers  can  normally  be  dismissed  without  notice,  compensation  or recourse. 
The  only  effective  restrictions  on  temporary  work  come  from  collective  bargains  where  for 
given firms trade unions may negotiate a commitment from the firm that they abstain from this 
market. 
In Japan,  the  temporary work  market provides an important element of duality alongside 
the lifetime employment system (see  Hobara,  1985).  About 10%  of non-agricultural employees 
are temporary or day labourers, with twice as  many women as  men in this category.  Temporary 
employment provides a margin of employment flexibility that enterprises want, and the lifetime 
employment system obviously cannot provide.  The pool of temporary workers tends to  be those 
who have quit other jobs and failed to obtain 'regular' recruitment after graduating from school. 
Directly employed temporary workers are typically subject to special employment rules,  notably 
allowing  for termination.  National  health  and  pension  coverage  is  typically provided  for,  but 
there may be exemptions from unemployment insurance for daily and seasonal workers.  Usually 
temporary workers are excluded from trade union membership. -24-
European regimes have diverged in the extent of their regulatory restriction of temporary 
work, although the EC Commission has proposed a directive to assure a degree of harmonisation 
(this proposed directive remains unpassed). 
Table  10:  Regulation of private sector temporary work agencies 
United States 
Japan 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Ireland 
Greece 
unregulated 
regulated, restricted to specified activities 
restricted under licensing system 
restricted under licensing system 
prohibited; law strongly prefers permanent employment contracts 
regulated under licensing system 
restricted under licensing system 
restricted under licensing system 
restricted under licensing system (only permitted in business and office 
branches) 
restricted under licensing system (only permitted in business and office 
branches) 
prohibited; direct temporary employment severely restricted since 1974. 
unregulated 
regulated under licensing system 
restricted to specific activities 
Note: Temporary work companies hire personnel to a third company for limited periods of time. 
Direct  temporary  employment  involves  only  employer  and  employee  in  a  contract  of  fixed 
duration. 
Source: Albeda (I  978). -25-
Italy  and  Sweden  are  at  the  most  restrictive  end  of the  regulatory spectrum  in Europe. 
Both  countries  prohibit  private  temporary  work  agencies,  and  both  severely  restrict  direct 
employment on the basis of non-permanent contracts.  Sweden, however, had freedom of direct 
temporary  employment until  197 4  when  restrictive  legislation  was  introduced.  Both  countries 
apparently  have  substantial  black  or grey  markets  in  temporary employment.  In  Sweden  the 
1976  "right-to-veto"  legislation  gave  trade  unions  the  power  to  object  to  temporary  work 
contracts  where  "improper  'practice  was  taken  to  be  involved"  but  not  necessarily  proved 
(Kennedy, 1984). 
A group of other European countries legislated in the period  1970  to  1976  to  regulate and 
restrict temporary  work  companies  quite  strictly:  Germany,  France,  Belgium,  Netherlands  and 
Denmark.  These  countries  operate  licensing  systems  for  such  companies  imposing  not  only 
obvious  requirements  such  as  social  security coverage  but also  a  variety of restrictions  on  the 
type of work or length of contract permitted.  Generally trade unions press for total prohibition 
of temporary employment,  and the legislation  that has  emerged reflects a compromise  between 
the desire of trade  unions  to  prohibit such agencies  and that of employers  to  have  freedom to 
satisfy special employment needs. 
In France, the Socialist government in 1982  tightened the regulations governing temporary 
work, following a rapid expansion of the number of such workers since  1975.  The uses of such 
labour  was  restricted  to  specific  situations,  such  as  to  fill  in  for  absence  of  a  permanent 
employee.  An "insecurity  bonus"  of 15%  had  to  be  paid  to  staff at the  end  of the  contract. 
Trade unions  were  given  statutory  rights  to  institute  legal  proceedings  against  abusive  use  of 
temporay work.  As  a result it was  estimated that a 30%  reduction in the number of employees 
of this type resulted in 1983.  In 1986, however, restrictions on temporary work were eased. 
In  the  United  Kingdom  direct  temporary  employment  (casual  labour)  has  been 
progressively reduced under legislation adopted in  1975  and  1976  of the  Labour government of 
the day. 
The law on fixed-term contracts in Europe tends to  be analogous  to that set for temporary 
workers.  Typically, regulations define restrictive conditions under which such contracts may are 
offered (seasonal  needs,  to  replace  a  permanent  employee's  temporary  absence,  etc),  and  the 
maximum  duration and  possibilities  for  extension  of the  contract.  The  1970s  saw  in  Europe -26-
widespread legislation making these regulations more comprehensive or restrictive.  The France 
governments  legislation  of  1982  appears  to  be  the  last  example  of the  period  of  tightening 
regulations.  Since  then  several  countries  have  opened  wider  opportunities  for  fixed-term 
contracts  as  a  way  of  easing  the  burden  of  severe  restraints  or  dismissals.  In  Germany 
legislation  in  1985  extended  the  maximum  duration  of fixed  term  contracts  from  6  to  18 
months, also removing the need for any particular justification of such contracts.  Spain adopted 
similar measures  already  in  1984.  Italy  in  1984  opened  new  possibilities  to  offer fixed  term 
contracts to young people.  France in 1986 reversed the restrictions introduced earlier. 
Table 11:  Regulation fixed-term contracts 
United States 
Japan 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Sweden 
Finland 
Norway 
Spain 
Greece 
Portugal 
unregulated 
permitted, but automatic renewal converts into permanent contract 
'82 law tightened criteria to  jobs only manifestly of a temporary nature; 
'86 law liberalises, extends duration to 24  months 
'85  law extends (temporarily until 1990)  duration from 6 to  18  months, 
with no justification required 
permitted only for seasonal or exceptional needs 
unregulated, freedom to make fixed-term contracts at will 
permitted,  but  if  extended  subsequent  dismissal  requires  official 
permission 
unregulated 
'82 law allows  6 month probationary period, and some special (seasonal) 
work,  including  up  to  6  months  employment  in  2  years  for  peak-load 
work periods 
permitted  only  when  motivated  by  temporary  nature  of  work,  or 
traineeship 
illegal, except for naturally limited jobs 
'84 law allows 6 mth - 3 yr contract for new firms 
permitted, but if repeated contract becomes permanent 
'75  law  allows  6  mth  to  3  yr  contracts  upon  evidence  of  temporary 
nature of work. 
Source: I.R.E. and E.I.R.R. (various issues). 
The  survey of the  International  Organisation of Employers  (I.O.E.,  1985)  indicated  that 
temporary work regulations were judged as  follows: -27-
Table  12:  Importance  of  regulatory  constraints  of  temporary  work  according  to  employers' 
organsations 
1.  Fundamental Constraints: 
2. Serious Constraints: 
3.  Minor or Insignificant Constraints: 
Source: I.O.E. (1985) 
Belgium 
Italy 
Spain 
France 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Austria 
Denmark 
Finland 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Norway 
Portugal 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
The  same  survey  reported  the  following  opinions  as  regards  regulation  of  fixed-term 
contracts: 
Table  13:  Importance of regulatory constraints of fixed-term employment contracts according to 
employers' organisations 
1.  Fundamental Constraints: 
2.  Serious Constaints: 
3.  Minor or Insignificant Constraints: 
Belgium 
Italy 
Netherlands 
France 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Sweden 
Austria 
Denmark 
Finland 
Ireland 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom -28-
Among  European  Community  countries,  the  Commission's  survey · of  1985  (C.E.C.,  1986) 
indicated the following  rank ordering according to the percentage of firms that would expect a 
positive employment impact from measures facilitating temporary contracts (fixed term, interim 
work, etc): 
Table  14:  Percentages  of  firms  expecting  a  positive  employment  impact  from  measures 
facilitating temporary contracts 
I.  Germany  74% 
2.  Luxembourg  69% 
3.  Italy  63% 
4.  Belgium  63% 
European Community average  55% 
5.  France  53% 
6.  Greece  50% 
7.  Ireland  4  7% 
8.  Netherlands  32% 
9.  United Kingdom  27% 
9.  Part-Time Work 
The extent of part-time work in the EC on average and in the United States is  not, in the 
aggregate, very different.  Some  13  million people  were  in  1983  working  part-time in the EC, 
compared to  15  million in the United States in 1985.  This amounts to  12  and 13%  of the labour 
force respectively.  However, the range  is  quite wide within Europe:  7%  in Italy,  9%  in France 
and  Germany,  20%  in the  United  Kingdom  and  even  higher  in Scandinavia.  Japan's  labour 
force includes 6  1/2% of part-time workers, a share that is  rising.  As  Dreze (1986)  has shown, 
a high share of part-time employment tends to in Europe to be associated with high total labour 
force  participation  rates.  This  reflects  the  widespread  preference  of second  workers  in  the 
family to be employed only part-time.  There is  on both sides of the Atlantic a preponderance 
of part-time work among women in the 25  to  SO  age bracket. 
The main difference in the structure of part-time work between the European average and 
the United States  is  seen  in greater number of young  people  (three  times  as  many)  who  work 
part-time in the United States compared to Europe.  In the United States part-time work among 
high school and university students is widespread and encouraged, whereas in Europe it is  much 
less so.  In the United States a little over one quarter of those in the age bracket 16  to 24  years 
old who are not in full-time labour force have part-time jobs. -29-
The policy regimes for part-time work tend to  be quite different as  between Europe and 
the United States. 
In Europe the broad thrust of policy has  been to  provide equality under the law for part 
and full-time  employment (see  EIRR,  1985).  This  principally  means  assurance  of equal  basic 
pay  per  hour  for  comparable  jobs,  equal  rights  under  employment  protection  law,  and  the 
requirment  of  social  security  coverage.  Social  security  contributions  will  normally  be 
proportional  to  salary,  but in  some  countries  the  regime  is  not  so  neutral  or simple.  Some 
countries  impose  substantial  minimum  social  security  contributions  (e.g.  Belgium)  which  may 
mean  very  heavy  taxes  on  short  lengths  of  working  time.  Others  allow  freedom  from 
contributions for work under a  certain level.  In  the  United Kindom this  limit is  expressed at 
L35.5  of weekly earnings,  which is  about one quarter of the average earnings for a full  week's 
work.  The  United  Kingdom  also  exonerates  jobs  of  under  8  hours  per  week  from  the 
provisions of employment protection law (or 8 to  16  hours if the employee has less  than 5 years 
of service).  The Government is  proposing  currently to  extend  these  thresholds.  It is  notable 
that part-time employment benefitting from these provisions has  been the main growth element 
in aggregate employment in the United Kingdom in recent years. 
In the  United States  there  is  no  legislation  governing  part-time employment.  Such  jobs 
are invariably subject to free hiring and firing conditions.  Social security contributions are paid 
at  normal  percentage  rates.  More  significant  is  the  fact  that  part-time  jobs  will  often  not 
benefit from  fringe  benefits  such  as  private  medical  insurance  and  private  pension  coverage. 
Since social security provides public medical coverage only for very poor or retired people, this 
is  an  important  effective  difference  between  the  primary  and  secondary  labour  market. 
However many female and young part-time workers are covered for private health insurance by 
family policies subscribed by the main income earner. 
Japan's regime is  in an intermediary category.  Part-time workers do  benefit from general 
social security coverage (including health insurance) as  in Europe but there are income ceilings 
beneath which second  family  workers do  not need  to  pay social  security contributions.  Part-
time workers often do  not benefit from employment protection rules and custom as  in the case 
of  regular  and  life-time  jobs.  Their  basic  wages  may  be  below  those  wages  of  regular 
employees. and they will often not receive bonus payments either (see Hobara, 1985). -30-
Table  15:  Structure of part-time employment by age  and sex  in the EC  (9)  and United States, 
thousands 
EC  (1983)  us  (1985) 
(years)  men  women  total  (years)  men  women  total 
young  (14-24)  532  1,223  1,755  (16-24  2,446  2,995  5,441 
prime age  (25-49)  568  7,010  7,578  (25-54)  878  5,569  6,447 
older  (50+)  935  2,859  3,784  (55+)  1,162  1,715  2,876 
Total  2,035  11,092  13,117  4,486  10,279  14,764 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Sample Survey,  1983.  Bureau of Labour Statistics, Employment 
and Earnings. 
10. Summary and Conclusions: Options for Policy Reform In  Europe 
The  first  option  for  consideration  is  the  most  radical:  total  deregulation.  This  is  not  a 
purely theoretical hypothesis. It was  for a long time  the regime of the United States,  although 
the judiciary is  through case  decisions now  increasingly filling  the void left by the absence of 
federal  legislation.  Economists  and business  school  writers  in the  United States  who  recognise 
the  advantages  of employment  security  for  employees  and  many  enterprises  often  draw  the 
conclusion that the optimal degree of employment security can be introduced through collective 
bargaining  or  the  simple  choice  of the  enterprise.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  arguments 
favouring an extension of employment security in industry in the United States beyond what the 
free  market  has  so  far  delivered.  Moreover,  the  legal  regime  for  coping  with  disputes  over 
individual dismissals  in the United States  appears to be in increasing difficulty, in the absence 
of general legislation providing a framework for case decisions. 
The reason for rejecting a de-regulation option for Europe would not, therefore, be  only 
political.  As  noted  above,  employment  security  provisions  generate  a  number  of effects  on 
labour costs,  employment and  productivity,  some  favourable  and some  unfavourable.  The  net 
impact seems likely to vary considerably between size of firms and types of activity.  Therefore 
the  proposition  of  blanket  deregulation  would  seem  ill-adapted.  While,  the  United  States' 
regime  appears on close  inspection  to  be less  satisfactory  than sometimes suggested,  Japan  has 
succeeded  in  reconciling  considerable  employment  security  with  little  unemployment. 
Politically, total deregulation in Europe would no doubt create very great conflict and instability 
in  industrial  relations.  Even  in  the  hypothesis  of  total  deregulation  by  the  state,  reasons  of -31-
economic  efficiency  would  recommend  that  a  large  share  of  total  employment  would  be 
governed  by  security  of  employment  contract.  The  process  of  wholesale  renegotiation  of 
employment contracts in all enterprises in the economy to  make  explicit what deregulation had 
rendered unspecified would be an awesome prospect. 
A second approach to reform is  to consider amending existing legislation where it appears 
. to  be  unduly  onerous,  .thus  retaining  the  existing  legal  framework  as  the  basis.  A  reasoned 
evolution of .the· status  quo  is  proposed.  In  fact  the  foregoing  survey  of the  existing  law  in 
Europe and Japan shows  that there are a  very large  number of eminently negotiable  variables 
filling  the space  between,  on  the one  hand,  the  regime  of total  deregulation and that,  on the 
other  hand,  of  the  most  constraining  possible  set  of · regulations.  A  struggle  over  choosing 
between  total  deregulation  versus  total  regulation  would  be  no  only  conflictual  but  also 
unnecessary,  given the opportunities for fine  graduations in the setting of the  policy variables. 
A selection of these  variables may  be  recalled for illustrative purposes:  the  length of notice for 
dismissals, the amount of compensation per year of service, the  criteria determining fair versus 
unfair dismissal, the criteria governing temporary and fixed-term contracts, the role of workers' 
representatives  in  procedures  leading  to  redundancies,  the  extent  of  exemptions  from  the 
standard laws for small enterprises, or for young or elderly workers etc. 
Four  general  .  principles  are  proposed  for  reviewing  the  optimality  of  employment 
protection rules: 
- the  social  and  economic  qualities  of  secure  employment  for  a  large  proportion  of 
employees and enterprises should be reflected in the basic design of the law; 
- however,  the  differences  of situation  between  categories  of employees  and  enterprises 
should  be  recognised,  so  as  to  avoid  excessively  rigid  constraints  either  for  employees 
who  do  not need or want  it, or for enterprises  who  need flexibility  in the size  of their 
labour force most; 
- it  should.  be  possible  to  sanction  the  shirking  worker  by  dismissal,  subject  to  legal 
safeguards against abuse; 
- the  enterprise  should  retain  the  prerogative  of judging  the  requisite  size  of its  labour 
force  and for  deciding  therefore upon  the  need  for  collective ·redundancies.  However, 
this  should  be  subject  to  respect  of minimum  requirements  for  financial  compensation -32-
and  procedural  delays  for consultation· with  workers'  representatives  and  to  assure  that 
alternative courses of action to collective redundancies are fully exploited. 
As  regards  policies  on  individual  dismissals  the  comparison  of national  regimes  suggests 
the. following  points.  The  sharpest  issue  is  whether  the  employer  has  in  effect the  power  to 
dismiss  a person for reasons of his misconduct or poor work performance.  In general European 
law distinguishes between "grave misconduct" and "unsatisfactory work performance".  Generally 
"grave  misconduct"  covers  criminal  acts  such  as  theft  and  bodily  violence.  In  these  cases 
summary  dismissal  is,  to  the  extent of the  author's  knowledge,  provided  for  in ·all  European 
countries.  The situation of "unsatisfactory work performance" (laziness, incompetence or lack of 
appropriate skills) ·is  more  varied.  European practices range  from  an apparent even-handedness 
of the law in some  countries (the United Kingdom for example) to  the practical impossibility of 
dismissal in others. The latter kind of regime covers a number of different practices, such as  the 
need  to  prove  incompetence  to  the  courts  (Portugal),  the  policy  of  the  courts  to  override 
professional  criteria  with  social  criteria  (Italy),  or  the  extremely  onerous  or  time-consuming 
procedures  that  recourse  to  the  courts  entails  (Belgium,  Germany,  Sweden).  Excessively 
protective legal  procedures have two  economic disadvantages. The small enterprise in particular 
can  be  discouraged  from  taking  on staff outside  the  family  wh~re the  sanction of dismissal  is 
absent.  The  working  atmosphere  and  productivity  of  a  team  of  workers  can  be  adversely 
affected by the presence in their midst of a worker who does not pull his or her weight. 
As  regards  collective  redundancies,  the  requirements  of the  EC  Directive  in  this  domain 
seem  to  be  quite  justifiable  in  laying  down  the  basis  for  a  consensus  model.  Minimum 
prenotification  periods  are  required,  as  are  consultations  with  workers'  representatives  and 
compensation  payments  as  a  function  of length  of service.  More  controversial,  and  going 
beyond  the  E.C.  Directive,  are  provisions  in which  either  trade  unions  or governments  retain 
powers of approval or authorisation.  Governments  have  power of approval in the  Netherlands, 
Spain and Portugal,  and  powers  to  defer action  in  Germany.  Management  can  in  these  cases 
claims  that a basic  prerogative is  being  denied to  them.  This  is  countered  in some  c~es with 
the  argument  that  the  labour  ministry  intervenes  with  a  light  hand,  or  that  the  political 
difficulties  for a  firm  in  making  redundancies  may  actually  be  eased  by  the  approval  of the 
government.  The  essential  point  would  seem  to  be  whether  enterprises,  in  their  recruitment -33-
planning, fear the probability of future constaints on  their freedom to adjust their labour force 
when demand is  low.  For several European countries surveys  suggest that this  is  the  case.  In 
some  countries  the  level  of  minimum  compensation  payments  is  also  relatively  high  and · 
perceived to  be  so by the enerprises. 
As  regards lay-off and short-time working arrangments, there seem to be some reasons for 
preferring the European system of short-time working, rather than the United States system of 
total  lay-offs.  While  the  most  effective  regime  doubtless  depends  upon  the  technology  of 
individual  industries,  short-time  working  has  the  advantage  of greater  equity  among  workers 
and less discontinuity of work experience.  In Italy the lay-off scheme has come to be abused to 
the considerable cost  of the state budget very high compensation  payments  go  to  many  people 
who for long periods of time find supplementary employment. 
Temporary work and fixed-term contract regulations allow for derogations,  in Europe and 
Japan,  from  the  dominant  regimes  of  permanent  and  secure  employment  contract.  -In  the 
United States there are simply no  such regulations,  because the dominant regime  places little or 
no  constraints  on  individual  or collective  termination  of contract.  An  important question  for 
European and Japanese policy makers is,  therefore, how  wide and open these derogations should 
be.  Some  countries  have  made  the  regulatory  restriction  on  temporary  work  and  fixed-term 
contracts  extraordinarily  severe.  As  noted  above,  for  example,  Italy  and  Sweden  prohibit 
private  temporary  work  agencies,  whereas  most  European  countries  license  such  agencies  in 
order  to  guard  against  abuse  of weak  members  of the  labour  force.  Other  countries  limit 
temporary  or fixed-term  work contracts  very  narrowly  to  certain  skills  or  circumstances.  On 
condition that social  security and  minimum wage  laws  are  respected for such employees_,  there 
would  be  two  advantages  in opening up  opportunities for  employment of this  type.  First,  on 
the labour supply side, many people who are marginal participants in the labour market (youths, 
elderly people approaching retirement, second workers in families) are not as  interested in long-
term  security  of employment  as  is  a  middle-aged  principal  income  earner  of a  family  with 
dependents.  Secondly,  on  the  labour  demand  side,  much  of  potential  employment  growth 
appears  to  lie  in  small  business  and  service  enterprises  which  have  a  stronger  economic 
preference for short-term employees,  compared with larger and  technologically advanced  firms 
which have a greater need for long-term employees. -34-
Similar considerations apply to  the supply and demand for part-time work.  The case  for 
assuring that these workers also are covered by social security is  strong.  However, their need to 
be  covered  by  the  employment  protection  regime  for  permanent  workers  is  not  so  strong, 
especially if ·there is here, as  is  to be suspected, a quite sharp trade off between the volume and 
security of job creation.  For many marginal members of the labour force  the buoyancy of job 
offers is a far more plausible source of effective employment security then the long-term nature 
of employment contracts for a relatively small number of job opportunities. 
As  regards  rules  of  recruitment  favouring  disadvantaged  .workers,  there  are  in  most 
European  countries  quotas  for  handicapped  workers,  whereas  there  are  no  significant  policy 
instruments of this  type in the United States.  In Europe  policy techniques  range  from  simple 
mandatory  quotas,  to  indicative  quotas  supported  by  the  taxation  of  under-performing 
enterprises  and  subsidies  for  those  employing  more  than  the  quota.  The  latter  policy  would 
seem more efficient, given uneveness in the possibility of different firms to  absorb handicapped 
workers  and  the  distortions  seen  in attempts  to  evade  mandatory quotas  (such  as  keep  a  firm 
below  a  minimum size).  Italy is  alone  in having some  other recruitment regulations  in which 
official  employment  agencies  have  a  role  to  saying  whom  enterprises  should  select.  These 
administrative processes seem quite archaic and due for scrapping. 
The  policy  strategy  for  employment  protection  regulations  should  not  be  decided  in 
isolation from the specific objectives of economic policy.  In the present European context three 
wider issues may enter into the picture: 
- objectives for the labour force participation rate; 
- interdependence in the choice of policy strategies  for employment protection on  the one 
hand, and for wage rigidity or flexibility on the other; 
judgements  about  the  acceptability  of a  certain  duality  in  the  labour  market  in  the 
interests of maximising employment and minimising threats to acquired rights. 
As  regards  the labour participation rate, .  relaxations in employment regulations  that led to 
increased job creation would also  be likely to  induce an increased supply of labour, for example 
among  the  young,  elderly  and  second  income  earners  in  the  family.  The  crucial  question 
therefore  is  whether  the  European  economy  needs  a  rising  labour  force  participation  rate,  or 
whether  it  should  alternatively  invest  in  labour  supply  reducing  measures  (early  retirement -35-
scheme,  etc.)  to  help  achieve  a  better balance  in  the  labour  market.  Demographic and social 
security  financing  considerations  strongly  point·  in  favour  of  increasing  the  btbour  force 
participation  rate,  without  which  social  security  taxes  will  rise  further  (thus  hurting  labour 
demand),  or  pensions  will  have  to be cut,  or  both.  .Of  course,  in  this  case,  such  policies 
favouring  expanded  labour  supply  should  also  be  accompanied  by  suitably  expansionary 
macroeconomic policies to assure that demand is adequate. 
It is  often observed that the  United States  has flexible  hiring and firing rules  but not so 
flexible  pay levels,  that Japan  has  considerable  rigidity  in hiring  and  firing  rules  but relative 
flexible  pay  levels,  whereas  Europe  is  relatively  rigid  on  both  accounts.  The  implied  policy 
choice  for a Europe  wishing  to  improve  its  employment situation is  between aiming  at either 
greater flexibility  in job tenure or in pay  levels,  or some  compromise  mix of the  two. .  There 
are  several  reasons  favouring  the  compromise  approach.  As  noted  above,  a  policy  of total 
deregulation  of  employment  protection  law  would  seem  to  be  undesirable  on  economic 
efficiency as  well as  political grounds.  On the other hand a policy .of total reliance on greater 
pay flexibility would be  very difficult to secure for at least two  reasons:  first,  the strength of 
institutional  rigidities  lying  behind  collective  bargaining  behaviour  and,  second,  the  fact  that 
rigid employment protection laws  serve to  prevent labour market  pressures,  notably from  the 
unemployed, from  bearing upon wage  bargainers.  Therefore a  complementary approach seems 
preferable,  aiming  at  moderate  and  ·mutually  supporting  reforms  in  the  direction  of  both  . 
employment protection and pay systems. 
As  regards  the. dual  labour market question,  there  are  issues  here of two  kinds.  Firstly, 
there is  the possibility, already mentioned, of stimulating a faster growth in the future of short-
term  and  part-time  employment  if  certain  changes·  in  employment  protection  law  were 
implemented.  Secondly,  there is  the issue  of whether to  acknowledge  acquired rights in terms 
of job security laws  of existing job-holders, but to change the rules for new employees.  There 
are several arguments  that go  in the direction of admitting rather than resisting  these  types of 
increased labour market duality. 
With  a  much  increased  labour supply  as  well  as  demand,  many of the  additions  to  the 
labour  force  would  be  relatively  favourably  disposed  towards  short-term and  part-time jobs. 
This prospect sometimes leads  to  fears  being  voiced  about creating increased "under ·classes"  in -36-
the labour  market.  However,  for Europe this  fear  would  seem  not to  be  very  pertinent in a 
situation  in  which  immigration  from  developing  countries  has  been  stopped  (unlike  in  the 
United States),  and in which .the  universality  of social  security coverage  would  be  maintained 
(also  unlike  the  United  States,  where  health  care  is  not  obtained  with  low  level  jobs). 
Relaxations of constraints on short-term work would,  for example,  be envisaged especially for 
young and elderly workers. 
Some  countries  (Germany,  Spain)  have  in  recent  years  reformed  their  employment 
protection  laws  in the  direction  of allowing  firms  much  more  liberal  recourse· to  fixed-term 
contracts for new recruits.  This particular policy move has  the quality that the situation of the 
existing  labour force  on  permanent contracts  is  not changed,  whereas  many  new  recruits  may 
have  a  different  status.  The  rationale  favouring  such  moves  is  two-fold.  By  leaving  the 
existing labour force  unaffected, this avoids  the  risk  that a general relaxation of the  rules  at a 
time  of relatively  weak  business  cycle  conditions  would  cause  a  flood  of dismissals.  On  the 
other hand the marginal cost of new employment is  reduced since  there would  be no  expected 
severance costs.  While  such a  development would  mean a  kind of increased duality,  its  social 
acceptability  should  also  be  rated  relatively  favourably  since  it  would  help  break  down  the 
differences  of  interest  between  insiders  (those  currently  employed  in  permanent  jobs)  and 
outsiders  (those  currently  unemployed)  in  the  labour  market.  Indeed,  this  duality  among  the 
employed  would  seem  more  preferable  than  the  graver  social  duality  separating  the  employed 
from the unemployed. -37-
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Annex 1 
Regulations Governing Individual Dismissals 
No  general law.  In absence  of contract or collective  bargain  employer 
or  employee  could,  in  principle,  terminate  at  will  without  notice  or 
compensation.  However, the judiciary increasingly erodes this situation, 
often inflicting heavy damages on employers in disputed cases. 
30  days  notice  required.  For  dismissal  for  economic  reasons  see 
collective redundancies.  Discharge as  disciplinary punishment possible. 
For  ordinary  dismissals  courts  will  nullify  if  company's  action 
unreasonable or not based on common sense of society. 
Legislation  of  1969  and  1972  permits  summary  dismissal  for  gross 
misconduct.  Otherwise  notice  of 2-3 months  required,  Works  Council 
must be consulted, dismissal  must not be "socially unwarranted".  Works 
Council must approve dismissal, if not employer must appeal to  Labour 
Court,  pending  which  employment  must  continue.  Compensation  for 
unfair dismissal 1 month pay per year of service. 
Legislation  permits  summary  dismissal  for  gross  misconduct.  For 
dismissal  for  economic  reasons  employee is  entitled to  public retraining 
facilities  and  minimum  financial  compensation  (as  for  collective 
redundancies). 
Industry and trade union agreement of 1965  and legislation of 1966  and 
1970  require  employer  to  supply  proof of justified  reasons;  employee 
may  demand  meeting  with  trade  union and employer, a  hearing before 
arbitration and appeal  to  the courts.  Compensation for unfair dismissal 
not less  than 5 months pay.  Dismissal considered practically impossible 
except for criminal acts. 
Legislation  of  1975  and  1978  protects  against  unfair  dismissal. 
Employee  can  appeal to  arbitration and tribunal, employer has  to  show 
substantive reasons.  Notice of 1 week per year of service, compensation 
1/2 to 1 1/2 weeks pay per year of service. 
Legislation  of  1966  and  1978  permits  summary  dismissal  for  gross 
misconduct.  Otherwise  notice  of 7 to  56  days  for  blue-collar workers 
or 3-15  months  for  white-collar  workers  is  required  (often  longer  by 
collective  agreement).  Appeals  to  tribunal  may  lead  to  compensation 
for unfair dismissal of at least 6 months pay. 
Legislation permits summary dismissal for gross  misconduct.  Otherwise 
approval of Labour Office must be obtained, with notice of 1-6 months 
week per year of service. 
Notice  periods and severance  pay is  largely  left to  (legally  enforceable) 
collective agreements. 
Legislation  of  1982  requires  notice  of  1-6  months,  and  consultations 
with trade union if requested.  Compensation for unfair dismissal  16-32 
months pay. 
Notice  periods and severance pay generally set in collective agreements. 
No  legal  obligation  to  pay  indemnities  other  than  wages  during  notice 
period. Norway 
Ireland 
Austria 
Switzerland 
Spain 
Greece 
Portugal 
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Legislation  of  1977  requires  notice  of  2  weeks  - 6  months  unless 
otherwise  agreed.  Consultation  with  shop  steward  mandatory. 
Employee may  appeal to  the court, normally being retained on full  pay 
meanwhile.  Compensation  for  unfair  dismissal  according  to  court 
decision. 
Tribunal  system  judges  complaints  of  "unfair  dismissal,"  which  if 
funded  leads  to  reinstatement or up  to  2  years  wages  in compensation. 
In 1983 200 cases were found in favour of employee, 370 cases against. 
Notice periods of 6 weeks to  5 months.  Works  Council consent must be 
obtained.  Compensation  of  2-3  weeks  per  year  of  service. 
Reinstatement customary in event of unfair dismissal. 
Legal  minimum  notice  periods  of  1-3  months  usually  extended  by 
contract or collective agreement, which also determine severance pay. 
Dismissals  for  economic  reasons  require  agreement  of Labour  Office, 
which  is  not  given  before  30  days,  possibly  deferred  by  a  further  30 
days.  Compensation for unfair dismissal up to  42  months pay. 
Dismissal  permitted after written notice and indemnity linked to  length 
of service. 
Legislation  of  1975  prohibits  dismissal  without  "just  cause",  which 
covers  gross  misconduct,  but not  professional  inability.  Employee  can 
appeal to  the courts, which will require proof of "just cause". United States 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Finland 
Norway 
Ireland 
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Annex 2 
Regulations Governing Collective Redundancies 
No  general  law.  15%  of  collective  bargains  contained  advance 
notification provisions (in 1980). 
Case  law  establishes  extensive  preconditions  for  legally  admissible 
redundancy of regular  workers:  objective need  to  reduce  labour  force, 
prior recourse  to  internal staff transfer, natural wastage,  work-sharing, 
dismissal  of  temporary  workers,  call  for  voluntary  retirement. 
Consultation  of work  force  required.  Compensation  not  required  by 
law, but customarily substantial. 
Legislation of 1969  requires prenotification of Labour Office and Works 
Council  of 30  days.  Labour  Office  may  extend  by  a  second  month. 
Notice and compensation as  for individual dismissals. 
According to  laws of 1964 and 1979,  employer must first consult Works 
Council  (which  must  prepare  its  opinion  within  14  weeks)  and  then 
request authorisation of Labour Office (which may defer its decision up 
to  30  days).  Severance  pay for  hourly  personnel,  20  hours  wages  per 
year of service minimum.  Law of 1986 abolishes role of Labour Office 
in authorisation and shortens statutory delays. 
Following  notification,  trade  unions  may  delay  by  25-40  days. 
Collective  dismissals  considered  practically  impossible,  unions  tend  to 
occupy plant until agreement negotiated. 
Legislation  of  1975  requires  earliest  possible  notification  of  Labour 
Office  and  consultation  with  trade  unions,  minimum  period  up  to  90 
days.  Compensation  of 1/2 to  I  1/2 weeks  pay  per year  of service, 
depending  upon  age,  with  35%  subsidised  by  public  funds  for  firms 
with less than I 0 employees. 
Legislation  of 1975  requires  30  days,  prenotification to  Labour Office, 
which may extend this  by 60  days.  Works  Council  must be consulted. 
Compensation as for individual dismissals. 
Legislation  of 1976  requires  30  days  prenotification of Labour Office. 
Works  Council  and  trade  union  have  to  be  consulted.  Labour  Office 
must authorise.  Compensation according to age and service. 
Works  Council  must  be  informed,  and  Labour  Office  given  30  days 
prenotification.  Compensation determined by contracts. 
Notice  of  2-6  months  required,  with  consultation  of  trade  unions, 
Labour  Office  and  local  authorities.  Compensation  by  collective 
agreement. 
Prior discussions with work force  required.  No  legal obligations to  pay 
compensation. 
Labour  Office  and  shop  steward  at  earliest  possible  stage.  No  legal 
obligations to pay compensation. 
30  days  notice, after employees have  been consulted and Labour Office 
informed.  Compensation as  for individual dismissals. Austria 
Switzerland 
Spain 
Greece 
Portugal 
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Discussions  with  trade  unions  and  Works  Council  required  at least  30 
days in advance.  Compensation as  for individual dismissals. 
No  general  legislation.  Prior  notification  recommended  in  a  general 
collective  agreement  of  1975.  Compensation  depends  mainly  on 
collective agreement. 
As  for  individual  dismissals,  30  days  minimum prenotification;  Labour 
Office  authorisation  required.  Compensation  20  days  pay  per year of 
service. 
Authorisation  of Labour Office required for  firms  with  more  than 20 
employees,  and  where  redundancies  exceed  2%  of the  work  force  per 
month.  Indemnities legally required. 
Prenotification of 60-90 days given to Works  Council, trade unions and 
Labour  . Office.  Authorisation  of  Labour  Office  required. 
Compensation of 1-2 weeks pay per year of service. -44-
Annex 3 
Resolution of Disputes Over Individual Dismissals 
in the United Kingdom - By  Arbitration and Tribunal 
The British system of resolving disputes over unfair dismissal is  of interest in that it appears to 
have qualities of expedition and even-handedness that are often absent in other countries.  The 
law  provides  that "every  employee  shall  have  the  right  not  to  be  unfairly  dismissed  by  his 
employer"  (Industrial Relations Act of 1971  and Employment Protection Act of 1978). 
In the period  1976  to  1982  about 40,000  cases  of contested individual dismissal  arose  per year 
on average.  The majority of cases  are resolved  in arbitration, where it often becomes  evident 
how  the  case  should  be  decided.  However  about  10,000  cases  are  heard  in  the  industrial 
tribunal.  About 30%  of such cases tend to  see the dismissed employee's complaint upheld, with 
the larger percentage found in favour of the employer. 
The law  provides that certain grounds for dismissal are automatically illegal (race, sex,  marital 
status).  Certain  other  grounds  are  automatically  unfair  (pregnancy,  membership  of a  trade 
union,  trade  union activities).  Capability, conduct, redundancy and "other substantial reasons" 
are potentially fair grounds for dismissal, depending upon reasonableness. 
The industrial tribunal consists of three persons with a lawyer (in the chair), and representatives 
of employers  and employees.  Judgements allow  considerable  room for managerial prerogative. 
Thus  the  high  court  of  appeal  has  ruled  "when  a  man  is  dismissed  for  incapacity  or 
incompetence it is  sufficient that the employer honestly believes on reasonable grounds that the 
man  is  incapable  or incompetent.  It is  not  necessary  to  prove  that he  is  infact incapable  or 
incompetent." 
In the event of the tribunal judging that dismissal was  unfair, basic compensation is  awarded of 
1/2  to  1  1/2  week's  pay  per  year  of service  with  possible  entitlement  to  a  larger  amount. 
Reinstatement is  possible but rare (3-5% of cases). 
Surveys have been made of the system and of the views of claimants and defendents.  Cases are 
generally heard within three months, and disposed of in a day or less.  The system is  relatively 
informal, and claimants  often present their own  cases.  The  majority of participants find that 
the time taken to reach  judgements is  about right, and have  a  favourable  view  of the tribunal 
system. 
As  regards  the  impact  of  the  system  on  recruitment,  brochures  of  the  Department  of 
Employment  draw  attention  to  the  relatively  low  success  rate  of complaints  against  unfair 
dismissal, thus seeking to dispel undue fears of small employers over the difficulty of dismissal. 
Source: Dickens et al ( 1985). -45-
Annex 4 
Texts from some Japanese Judicial Decision on Dismissals 
The  following  two  cases,  one  concerning  an  individual  dismissal,  the  other  collective 
redundancies, illustrate the use  and content of court decisions  in defining the rules of dismissal 
in Japan.  They are extracts from the court decisions, as  reproduced by Sugeno (1985). 
1.  Abuse of Right of Dismissal 
Supreme Court Judgement, January 31,  1977, Second Petty Bench (Shioda v.  Kochi Broadcasting 
Co.) 268  Rodo Hanrei 17. 
Facts:  The  Plaintiff  had  been  employed  by  Defendent  company  as  an  announcer.  He  was 
committed the  following  negligence  which  fall  into  the  reason  of discipline  prescribed  in the 
Work of Rule of the Company. 
1.  Plaintiff was  working overnight from 6:00  p.m. of February 22nd of 1967  until 10:00  a.m. of 
the  next  morning  together  with  a  reporter  in  charge  of new  manuscript.  He  overslept  until 
around 6:20  a.m. of 23rd and could not broadcast entirely the regular news  program which was 
due to be done for 10  minutes from 6:00a.m. (the first failure). 
2.  He  also  worked overnight together  with  another  reporter from  7th  to  8th  of March of the 
same year and again missed a news program for 5 minutes from 6:00a.m. in the morning of 8th 
(the second failure). 
3.  He  failed  to  report  the  second  failure  to  his  superior  and  submitted  a  report  with  some 
camouflage when he  was  requested  to  report by the director of his  section around March  14th 
and  15th.  The  Company  did  not  take  a  disciplinary  punishment  (discharge)  but  simply 
dismissed  him taking  his  future  fate  in consideration.  Plaintiff brought the case  to  the  court 
asking  to  confirm his  employment status  holding  that the  dismissal is  too  severe and abuse  of 
right of dismissal.  In both of the  first and second instances the Courts admitted  the Plaintiff's 
request  and declared  the  dismissed  null  and  void.  The  Supreme  Court  sustained  the  original 
judgement. 
Excerpt of the Court's Opinion 
Plaintiff's above  described  failures  in this  particular  case  fall  under  the  reason  of (ordinary) 
dismissal prescribed in the Article  15,  No.  3 of the Work  Rule of the Company too.  However, 
even  when  there  is  a  reason  of ordinary  dismissal  the  employer  is  not  always  permitted  to 
dismiss  the employee.  The dismissal  could be  null and  void as  abuse of the  right of dismissal 
when the the dismissal is  extremely unreasonable and not to be admitted to be appropriate based 
on the common sense  of the  society depending  on  the  actual situations of the  individual case. 
In this particular case, two failures he  had committed were in their nature something to damage 
the social credit of the Company.  The fact that he had overslept and caused the same kind of 
failure twice in two weeks showed his lack of responsibility as  an announcer.  Furthermore, he 
had  not  admitted  his  failure  in  the  second  case  not  straight-forward.  All  these  points  he  is 
certainly not blameless.  However,  judging from  the facts  confirmed by the original instances 
his  failures  were  not  caused  by  his  malice  or  on  purpose  but  by  his  negligence,  namely 
oversleeping.  It is  rather too  harsh to  blame only Plaintiff since in both cases of his failure the 
reporters were supposed  to  wake  him up  but they also  overslept and failed  to  wake  up and to 
give him  the manuscript of the  news  program.  Plaintiff had apologized  immediately after his 
first failure and in the second case he tried to  start work as  soon as  he woke up.  In both cases 
the  vacant  p'eriod  of broadcasting  was  not  so  long.  The  Company  was  not  taking  a  perfect 
arrangement to secure the early morning new  program.  His submission of a camouflaged report 
was  partly a result of his  misunderstanding of whether the door of the first floor was  closed or 
not and partly a  result of his  awkwardness  because  of his  repeated mistakes  in a short period. 
Judging from all  these  points he  is  not to  be strongly blamed.  He  has  committed no  failure in ~  46-
announcement work until this time.  His performance has  been not particularly bad in the past. 
The reporter in the case  of the second  failure  was  punished only  by  warning.  No  announcer 
was dismissed because of the failure in braodcasting in the past.  Plaintiff has finally apologized 
for the second failure too.  Judging from these circumstances to dismiss him is  rather too severe 
and tends to lack in reasonableness.  Thus it could possibly  be regarded as  inappropriate in the 
common  sense  of the  society.  Therefore  the  judgement of the  original  instance  holding  the 
dismissal of this case as abuse of the right of dismissal and null and void is  proper. 
2.  Dismissal Due to Closing Down of Division 
Tokyo High Court Judgment, October 29,  1979 (Toyo Sanso K. K. v.  Koji Shimazaki et al.) 
30 Rominshu 1002 
Facts:  The Appelant, having its principal office in Tokyo and business offices and factories  in 
eight  locations  throughout  Japan,  is  engaged  in  the  business  of  manufacturing  and  selling 
various high pressure gases  such as  oxygen, acetylene and liquefied petroleum gas.  (As of 1970, 
the  amount  of capital  waS  1,520,000,000  Yen,  and  the  number  of emplolyees  as  532.)  The 
Appellant decided to  close down its entire acetylene division and on July 24,  1970  informed all 
47  employees of the division,  including  another  12  other appellees,  of its  intention to  dismiss 
them.  This action is  a  request  for a  preliminary  injunction for a  preserving  position filed  by 
the  Appellees,  13  employees  among  the  4  7,  asserting  that  this  dismissal  is  an  abuse  of the 
dismissal power. 
Tokyo District Court (April  19,  1976,  255  Rohan 58)  granted the  Appellees'  petition.  That is, 
the  first  trial  held  that "in  order  for  the  dismissal  of the  Appellant's  employees  in  a  certain 
division which has  been closed  down  to  be  considered  valid  when  as,  in the  instant case,  the 
Appellant  asserts  unavoidable  business  necessity;  the  closing  down  of the  division  should  be 
reasonable from a management point of view, as  should be  the dismissal of the employees, and 
moreover the dismissal procedures should be  generally acceptable  to  society."  The court found 
that the first condition had been satisfied for the following  reasons.  In general, even when the 
management  for  unavoidable  reasons  has  to  close  down  a  specific  business  division  it  goes 
without  saying  that  the  employees  in  the  division  should  hopefully  be  minimal.  Therefore, 
when the Appellant closed down the  acetylene division,  it should have  tried to  avoid dismissal 
of the  employees  in the  division  as  much as  possible  by taking  steps  such  as  transferring  the 
employees  to  the  Appellant's  other  business  divisions,  or  by  calling  for  voluntary  retirement 
among the employees  in the division or in the whole  company.  If the Appellant dismissed all 
the employees  in the division without taking such steps  in spite of the fact that it was  able to 
do so,  then it can be said that the dismissal  was  not unavoidable from a  business  management 
point of view. 
Excerpts From the High Court's Opinion 
The judgement of the Tokyo District Court shall be reversed, and the petition of the Appellees 
shall be dismissed. 
In general, an enterprise can freely decide to  close down a specific business division, since it is 
a  decision  with  respect  to  managment  policy  within  its  exclusive  discretion.  This  does  not 
directly mean, however, that the enterprise, as  an employer, can freely dismiss the employees in 
the division when  it decides  to  close  down  the  division.  In order for  the employer's  decision 
dismissing  the  employees  in  the  division  to  be  justified  as  being  based  upon  "unavoidable 
business necessity,"  the following  requirements shall be met and considered sufficient except in 
unusual  circumstances.  First,  the  closing  down  of the  business  division  must  be  found  to  be 
based  upon avoidable  necessity from the  viewpoint of reasonable  managment of the enterprise. 
Second,  the dismissal  for  the reason  of the closing  down of a  business  division  should  not  be 
arbitrary on the employer's part.  Such a dismissal can be  held not arbitrary only if there is  no 
room for tranferring the employees to identical or similar jobs in the other business divisions in 
the same or other business locations not far from the original place of busniess, or if there is  no 
way  to  avoid  a  surplus  of employees  in  the  whole  enterprise even  after  the  execution  of the -47-
above-mentioned  transfer.  Third,  the  selection  of  the  actual  retirees  should  be  based  on 
objective and reasonable criteria. -48-
Annex 5 
Conclusions of a Study by (Manes and ·Rosenbloom of the Harvard Law School) on the United 
States Legal System for Handling Disputed Individual Dismissals (Excerpts) 
"The Current system for handling claims of unfair discharge, if one may call it a system at all, 
is not working.  The courts continue to create more problems than they resolve.  Society, as  well 
as  employers and· employees, has been ill served by the law's response to the  problem of unfair 
discharge.  The conclusion seems unavoidable that legislation is  required to  balance the interests 
of all concerned. 
"Our survey of the current case law leaves little room to doubt that the judicial system does not 
adequately promote  the  interests of employers  or employees.  By  its  very nature  the litigation 
process is slow, costly, and formal.  Some commentators claim that the courts lack the necessary 
labor expertise  and  perspective  to  properly address  unfair discharge  problems.  Clearly courts 
have  been  anything  but  uniform· in  their  decisions,  as  judges  have  attempted  to  combat 
percieved  unfairness  by  formulating  rules  which  often  are  both  over  and  under  inclusive. 
Ultimately,  these  rules  are  ill  tailored  to  protect either  the  employees'  or employers'  interest. 
Further, handicapped  by  the  limited  remedies  a  judge  can  adopt,  and  the  erratic  manner in 
which  juries  allot  compensatory  and  punitive  damages,  the  courts  are  destabilizing  the 
employment relationship. 
"Case  by  case  adjudication  has  proven  to  be  a  poor  way  of . regulating  the  employment 
relationship.  Already  courts  have  begun  to  express  the  fear  that  their  duty  to  develop  a 
common law of wrongful discharge threatens  to  render the  court a  bargaining agent for every 
employee not protected by statute or collective bargaining agreement. 
"The  courts  themselves  recognize  the  need  for legislative action.  Although sympathetic  to  the 
unfairness  that may accompany the dismissal  of an  at-will employee,  many courts  nonetheless 
feel that the legislature is  the appropriate agency for effecting a change in policy regarding the 
employer-employee  relationship.  In  Murphy  v.  American  Home  Products  Corp.,  New  York's 
highest court refused to recognize the tort of wrongful discharge.  The court reasoned: 
Those jurisdictions that have modified the traditonal at-will rule appear  to  have 
been motivated by conclusions that the freedom of contract underpinnings of the 
rule have become outdated, that individual employees  in the modern work force 
do  not have  the bargaining power to  negotiate security  ... and that the rule  yields 
harsh  results  for  those  employees  who  do  not  enjoy  the  benefits  of  express 
contractual limitations on the  power of dismissal.  Whether these conclusions  are 
supportable  ... are issues better left to  resolution at the hands of the legislature  . 
.. .If  the  rule  of  nonliability  for  termination  of  at-will  employment  is  to  be 
tempered  if  should  be  accomplished  through.  a  principaled  statutory  scheme, 
adopted  after opportunity  for  public  ventilation,  rather  than in  consequence  of 
judicial resolution of the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigant.  .. 
"Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently noted: 
What  categories  of employment  should  be  given  [protection]  and  what  criteria 
should determine  whether there  exists  good  cause  for a  discharge  are questions 
which  the  General  Assembly  may  deal  with  more  comprehensively  than  the 
courts. 
"In  view of the erratic and inconsistent  judicial development of the  law of 'unfair discharge', 
we  believe a better approach to  the problem may be  found in state legislation.  Moreover, there -49-
is  more  that recommends  a legislative  approach  than simply  the  failure  of courts to  provide a 
comprehensive ·and effective solution to the wrongful discharge problem.  The policy issues that 
arise are intensely political, and resolution of these issues  will not be found merely by referring 
to  the  'brooding omniprescence'  of the  common law,  but rather by  informed public discussion. 
The history of labor regulation in this  country ·has  of necessity  been a  history of balances and 
. trade-offs.  It  is  this  'trading-off'  of employer  and  employee  interests  that  legislatures  are 
uniquely qualified to  perform~" 
Source: Manes and Rosenbloom (  1985). -50-
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